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Abstract 
We provide an assessment of the determinants of the risk premia paid by non-financial 
corporations on long-term bonds. By looking at 5,500 issues over the period 2005-2012, we 
find that in recent years the sovereign debt market turbulence has been a major driver of 
corporate risk. Compared with the three-year period 2005-07 before the global financial 
crisis, in the years 2010-12 Italian, Spanish and Portuguese firms paid on average between 
70  and  120  basis  points  of  additional  premium  due  to  the  negative  spillovers  from  the 
sovereign debt crisis, while German firms got a discount of 40 basis points.  
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1.Introduction
1 
We study the evolution of the actual cost of debt financing faced by non-financial 
corporations  by  analysing  the  yield  offered  on  bonds  at  launch.  We  focus  on  a  market 
measure of the risk of debt issuance: the asset swap (ASW) spread (sourced by Thomson 
Reuters Datastream) which is the difference between the bond yield and a corporate risk-
free rate.
2 We rely on the yield at issuance since the secondary market pricing of any debt 
security is a measure of the soundness and creditworthiness of the issuing institution in that 
moment but it does not change the cost borne by firms on already issued bonds. Thus we 
differentiate from the literature on corporate bonds with respect to two aspects: on the one 
hand, we do not investigate the timing and the reasons supporting the firms’ decision to 
finance themselves via debt (Cantillo and Wright 2000; Barry et al. 2009), since we look 
directly  at  the  gross  issuance;  on  the  other  hand,  we  depart  from  the  literature  on  the 
evolution over time of credit spreads in the secondary market (Collin-Dufresne et al. 2001; 
Elton et al. 2001; Driessen 2005), since we focus on the funding cost faced by firms on the 
primary market. The papers closest to us are Morgan and Stiroh (2001), Sironi (2003) and 
Cardillo and Zaghini (2012) which, relying on market spreads on new bond issues, analyse 
the determinants of the risk premium on bank debt. 
Our initial sample consists of 6,140 bonds – with maturity longer than 1 year – issued 
by non-financial corporations in the euro area, the UK and the US over the period 2005-
                                                           
1 The authors would like to thank A. Cardillo, G. Grande, S. Masciantonio and S. Siviero for helpful 
discussions and useful suggestions. The views expressed in the paper do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Bank of Italy.  
2 The ASW spread is the spread over the LIBOR (EURIBOR) which is paid on the floating leg of an asset 
swap contract in order to make the present value of the floating leg and fixed leg equal. Having to deal with 
corporate market instruments we preferred to rely on the reference corporate market rate. In addition, instead of 
using ad hoc interpolated yield curves of sovereign securities we relied on a publicly provided measure.     
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2012. The time span gives us the possibility to monitor two different phases of the recent 
financial  turmoil:  the  turbulent  period  following  the  subprime  mortgage  crisis  and  the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the later period of sovereign debt crisis which affected 
several euro-area economies. 
Table 1: Issuance characteristics by country  and size 
Size  TOT S M L TOT S M L TOT S M L TOT S M L T1 T2 Med
2005 6 2 2 2 6 2 2 2 2.5 0.2 0.3 2.0 91 225 44 3 12.3 29.0 24.6
2006 113 19 37 57 47 15 16 16 49.9 7.1 17.0 25.8 37 117 36 12 6.9 27.9 19.2
2007 93 16 41 36 45 14 15 16 53.1 6.0 17.2 29.9 42 99 23 39 11.6 35.2 22.5
2008 142 51 28 63 49 17 14 18 73.5 21.6 14.7 37.2 138 112 162 148 18.2 30.2 26.5
2009 284 57 89 138 114 38 39 37 201.0 28.8 61.0 111.2 247 285 213 253 9.4 24.9 17.7
2010 228 46 67 115 113 39 36 38 112.6 15.1 30.1 67.4 207 333 211 155 4.2 22.6 10.2
2011 201 35 63 103 100 32 34 34 93.1 10.3 26.5 56.2 208 333 225 155 4.0 25.7 10.1
2012 334 63 84 187 144 47 48 49 150.6 17.5 34.5 98.6 229 367 249 174 6.1 26.7 10.2
Total 1401 289 411 701 319 150 106 63 736.2 106.5 201.3 428.5 188 264 183 161 9.1 27.8 17.6
Size  TOT S M L TOT S M L TOT S M L TOT S M L T1 T2 Med
2005 7 2 1 4 5 2 1 2 4.5 0.4 0.8 3.3 22 13 73 14 24.4 46.8 25.9
2006 39 8 9 22 15 5 5 5 20.3 2.2 5.6 12.5 52 68 101 26 5.0 20.6 9.0
2007 35 5 17 13 12 4 4 4 17.7 1.7 9.2 6.7 51 73 56 35 6.4 32.0 16.3
2008 57 9 30 18 20 7 6 7 35.3 4.6 15.5 15.2 177 315 162 132 11.9 28.4 19.7
2009 97 13 36 48 34 11 12 11 43.3 3.5 9.6 30.2 254 356 283 204 3.8 21.4 10.9
2010 46 10 16 20 28 9 10 9 21.0 2.6 7.0 11.3 230 302 245 183 1.7 7.3 4.3
2011 43 14 9 20 22 7 7 8 21.4 6.0 5.0 10.3 236 307 295 159 4.4 26.9 9.5
2012 91 18 25 48 45 15 15 15 50.2 5.2 14.1 30.9 233 425 236 158 3.3 11.9 8.7
Total 415 79 143 193 104 47 35 22 213.5 26.3 66.7 120.5 194 296 206 144 7.6 24.4 13.0
Size  TOT S M L TOT S M L TOT S M L TOT S M L T1 T2 Med
2005 81 15 15 51 40 13 13 14 32.9 2.6 3.0 27.2 32 82 88 1 4.8 16.5 6.9
2006 270 44 52 174 113 37 38 38 123.5 10.7 18.1 94.7 85 204 156 34 3.9 15.4 6.3
2007 538 109 138 291 224 77 72 75 222.3 24.4 44.1 153.7 108 215 130 57 3.0 9.9 5.0
2008 510 93 128 289 206 72 66 68 210.6 17.8 35.3 157.4 200 281 216 166 4.1 13.2 8.2
2009 697 120 160 417 292 99 96 97 285.4 27.2 50.9 207.3 304 414 363 250 4.0 13.1 6.7
2010 639 117 164 358 285 96 93 96 238.3 30.3 57.2 150.8 196 328 214 145 3.3 10.7 5.8
2011 711 129 163 419 281 95 95 91 261.9 35.5 61.7 164.7 173 312 189 123 4.6 13.4 7.0
2012 878 160 221 497 400 134 132 134 395.9 46.6 83.8 265.5 213 385 243 145 3.4 10.9 6.1
Total 4324 787 1041 2496 851 387 277 187 1,770.7 195.1 354.2 1,221.4 193 317 224 140 3.9 12.9 6.5
Stat
Stat
Stat Number of issuers Volume ASW
ASW
Number of issuers Volume ASW
Number of issuers Volume
US
UK
Euro Area
Number of issues
Number of issues
Number of issues
 
NOTE.– Volume in billion of euro; ASW spread in basis points. For each year, issuers by country are 
divided into three size groups (Small, Medium, Large) according to the total assets distribution: the two 
threshold values (tertiles) and the median are reported in the last three columns (billion of euro). 
Sources: Dealogic and Thomson Reuters Datastream 
Table 1 shows a common pattern across-geographic areas in the development of the 
issuance activity: the annual amount of new debt raised in the capital market more than 
doubled between 2006 and 2012. The placement volume shows a steady upward path with    
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two peaks in 2009 and 2012. We have 4,324 bonds placed by companies located in the US, 
1,401 in the euro area and 415 in the UK. In the euro-area sub sample, about two thirds of 
the  overall  issuance  are  by  French  and  German  firms  with  529  and  368  bonds  issued, 
respectively.
3 While there is a steady dominance of US companies as regards the number of 
bonds issued, the average issuance per firm is rather similar across countries, ranging from 
4.0 bonds issued by non-financial corporations in the UK, to 4.4 in the euro area and 5.1 in 
the US.  
Bearing in mind these main stylised facts, we focus on two firm characteristics which 
significantly influence the ability to access debt capital markets: size and rating class. As for 
the former, size affects the ability to issue bonds because of the fixed cost associated to the 
public placement as searching, monitoring and agency costs (Blackwell and Kidwell 1988). 
Large  firms  with  bigger  issues  can  cope  better  with  these  costs,  since  they  are  able  to 
generate significant economies of scale (Denis and Mihov 2003). By dividing the sample in 
tertiles according to the total assets distribution, from Table 1 we can compute the share of 
bonds issued by small firms: it ranges from 18.2 to 20.6 per cent, whereas the same share in 
terms of volumes is even smaller (from 11 per cent in the US to 12.3 in the UK and 14.5 in 
euro area).  
Regardless  of  the  geographic  location,  the  ASW  spread  paid  at  issuance  is 
significantly  higher  for  smaller  issuers.  Companies  within  the  first  tertile  often  paid  a 
premium between two and three times that of firms within the third tertile. In addition, the 
financial crisis seems to have hit firms of the same size differently by geographic area. 
                                                           
3 Nationality and industry group are those of the parent company. Data related to euro area are available for 
13  countries  (Austria,  Belgium,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).  
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During the first phase of the financial turmoil (2007-2008), the ASW spread increased more 
for large than small companies in the US and euro area, while it was the other way around 
for the UK. However, from 2009 the difference in the ASW spread paid by small and large 
firms significantly increased to reach the maximum in 2012 in each of the three economies 
(194 bp in euro area, 240 bp in the US and 267 bp in the UK). 
Table 2: ASW spread by country and issuer rating 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
IG -11 46 41 228 225 159 241 267 194
1 4 13 6 26 13 13 22 98
HY 205 403 519 403 477 389
2 1 1 3 2 9
IG 40 6 19 153 217 103 156 96 121
2 44 18 38 74 36 33 77 322
HY 161 157 476 510 427 489 455
1 2 3 12 13 15 46
IG 30 16 91 219 139 142 165 135
32 41 71 91 84 81 92 492
HY 221 584 375 364 446 410
3 4 9 7 14 37
IG 26 38 35 171 173 96 214 290 165
1 6 4 4 15 10 9 16 65
HY 321 634 688 537 489 590
1 1 6 3 2 13
IG 64 345 234 184 224 546 294
3 4 8 4 5 7 31
HY 504 596 655 621 601
3 6 2 11 22
IG 91 23 31 133 230 138 158 173 150
6 107 87 140 270 185 167 275 1,237
HY 289 206 467 582 495 442 488 470
6 6 2 14 44 35 57 164
IG 22 52 51 177 224 179 174 177 161
7 39 35 57 89 40 39 78 384
HY 591 570 833 564 607
8 6 4 13 31
IG 21 34 67 183 251 132 126 130 141
77 222 446 477 602 516 607 680 3,627
HY 232 321 303 439 638 464 443 502 462
4 48 92 33 95 123 104 198 697
United States
Spain
Greece-Ireland-
Portugal
Italy
France
United Kingdom
Euro Area 
Germany
 
NOTE.– ASW spread in basis points, number of placements in italic. 
Sources: Dealogic and Thomson Reuters Datastream 
As for the rating class of bonds, Table 2 reports the pattern of the issuance premium, 
splitting the issues in “Investment Grade” and “High Yield” (henceforth IG and HY). In the 
period considered, the risk premium on bonds increased in all areas and for both rating 
classes. In 2006 the average ASW spread for IG issues was 6 basis points for Germany and    
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46 bp, 38 bp and 64 bp for Italy, Spain and the GIP group (Greece, Ireland and Portugal), 
respectively.  IG  placements  from  firms  in  the  UK  and  the  US  paid  an  ASW  spread 
somewhat higher than euro area (34 bp and 52 bp, respectively versus 23 bp of euro area). In 
the same year, risk premia for HY issues were considerably higher: they ranged from 161 bp 
in Germany to 321 bp in Spain and the US.  
As  for  the  crisis  period,  in  the  US  and  the  UK,  the  ASW  spread  substantially 
increased for IG issues in the early phase of the subprime mortgages crisis (2007 and 2008), 
and after a peak in 2009, it levelled off at a lower level. The pattern is similar for HY 
placement by firms in the US, while it is more erratic in the UK given the reduced issuance 
of  HY  bonds  by  British  firms.  In  the  euro  area  there  were  sizeable  differences  across 
countries: Germany exhibited a development relatively similar to that of US and UK bonds 
with IG rating, but not to that of HY placements. In particular, while for German IG bonds 
the average ASW spread reached 217 bp in 2009 to decline to 96 bp in 2012, for HY issues 
the spread fluctuated around the 2009 levels also in the following years, thus not showing 
signs of a recovery. 
An even clearer effect of the sovereign bond crisis can be detected in Italy, Spain and 
GIP countries. Italian firms were significantly hit by the first wave of the financial crisis with 
the  ASW  spread  for  IG  placements  considerably  increasing  from  2007  to  2008  when  it 
reached a peak at 228 basis points, badly performing with respect to Germany, France and 
Spain. After a very difficult 2009, in 2010 financing conditions on bond markets seemed to 
have started improving and moving back towards pre-crisis times, at least as credit spreads 
are concerned: Italy moved in accordance with all the other countries, even though only the 
issuances from GIP countries paid a higher ASW spread. However, in 2011 and 2012, when 
the government bond crisis after Ireland and Portugal hit also Italy and Spain, a decoupling    
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from  France  and  Germany  became  evident.  While  in  Italy  and  Spain  the  ASW  spread 
increased  significantly  to  reach  the  maximum  in  2012,  it  decreased  in  Germany  and  it 
increased only slightly in France. Italian and Spanish IG issues paid in 2012 around 170 bp 
and 200 bp, respectively, more than German bonds within the same rating class. Instead, the 
cost of  the HY issuance behaved in a similar way in the four countries; in 2012 the average 
ASW spread ranged from 446 bp in France to 489 bp in Spain and Germany. 
2. Econometric evidence 
In order to empirically assess the determinants of the premium on corporate bonds we 
propose a panel regression of the ASW spread paid at launch by firms over the 8 years from 
2005 to 2012. From the complete set of bonds for which the ASW spread is available, our 
analysis  restrict  to  around  5,500  issues  for  which  we  have  the  complete  list  of  bonds’ 
characteristics. They are issued by 1,100 firms headquartered in 15 countries (13 euro-area 
countries, the UK and the US). The value of the premium paid on bonds is determined by 
several factors, including the characteristics of the issuer (such as size and industry group), 
those  of  the  bond  (such  as  issuance  volume  and  maturity),  and  of  course  the  market 
sentiment. It can also reflect the creditworthiness of the sovereign: in fact, as happens for 
banks, the sovereign rating is almost everywhere perceived by market agents as a cap for the 
risk assessment of issuing institutions. Our empirical investigation tries to disentangle the 
contribution of each characteristic of these four groups. We thus run the following regression 
by means of pooled OLS with time dummies to take into account the dynamics: 
e a a a a a + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
time
z z
country
l i l
issue
k i k
issuer
j i j i D V V V spread , , , 0 ; 
where  spread  is  the  ASW  spread  at  launch  of  each  bond, 
issuer
j V   are  the  variables 
characterizing the issuer (size, leverage, industry, rating), 
bond
k V  are the variables of the bond    
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features (volume, maturity, currency, rating), 
country
l V   are the variables associated with the 
country of residence of the parent issuer (rating, CDS spread, geographic area), 
time
z D  are 
time dummies which take into account the market conditions at the time of issuance. In the 
regressions all exogenous variables are taken at time t (the exact issuance day) with the 
exception of balance sheet data which are lagged by one year. Table 3 reports the summary 
statistics  of  the  main  variable  employed  in  the  regression  procedure,  excluding  dummy 
variables. 
Table 3. Summary statistics  
 Observations  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. Max Min
ASW spread 5,427 185 140 174 1,072 -155
Leverage 5,427 54 51 31 99 0.1
Total asset 5,427 91 24 180 544 2.8
Duration 5,427 3,745 2,931 3,365 36,680 365
Volume 5,427 448 351 389 3,720 0.6
Firm Rating 5,427 12 12 3.6 20 2.0
Bond Rating 5,427 13 13 3.6 20 2.0
Sovereign Rating 5,427 20 20 1.1 25 1.0
Sovereign CDS 5,427 70 42 770 3,703 1.3
Issuer CDS 5,050 103 57 147 3,120 3.8
Employees 1,994 90,947 49,861 179,136 2,100,000 22  
ASW spread is the difference between the bond yield and the fixed-leg rate of a swap contract with the same 
maturity (basis points). Leverage is the ratio between debt and debt+equity multiplied by 100. Total asset is the 
firm balance sheet value of all assets (billion of euros). Duration is the bond maturity at issuance (days). 
Volume is the face value of the bond (million of euro). Firm Rating, Bond Rating and Sovereign Rating are the 
average of the ratings provided by Moody’s, Fitch and Strandard&Poors linearised between 0 (C-) and 25 
(AAA). Issuer CDS and Sovereign CDS are the average of the daily credit default swap for 5-year contracts 
computed in the 15-day period before the bond issuance (basis points). Employees is the number of employees 
working for the non-financial corporation. 
We start with a basic specification and then we add some variables at each estimation 
round; we report only the estimates for which the explanatory variables turned out to be 
significantly  different  from  zero.  The  first  column  of  Table  4  shows  that  the  standard 
characteristics of the issue have the expected sign: the longer the duration and the larger the 
volume the higher the cost at launch. Also the currency denomination in euro seems to abate    
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the  ASW  spread paid by  firms  (negative  coefficient). Note  that  the positive  sign  of  the 
issuance size may reflect the fact that the market assesses negatively the increased debt 
burden, or simply that, in order to place a larger issue, firms are required to pay a higher 
spread (Shi; 2003). In addition, the estimated coefficient of the bond rating has the expected 
negative sign (a better rating leads to a smaller risk-premium). 
Table 4: OLS regressions over the whole sample
1 
Leverage 0.5742 *** 0.5657 *** 0.5627 *** 0.4384 *** 0.4464 ***
0.0840 0.0834 0.0865 0.0756 0.0768
Total Assets 0.2568 *** 0.2540 *** 0.2338 *** 0.2880 *** 0.2847 ***
0.0160 0.0163 0.0183 0.0171 0.0172
Total Assets^2 -0.0006 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0006 ***
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Duration 0.0047 *** 0.0047 *** 0.0049 *** 0.0065 *** 0.0065 ***
0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
Volume 0.0320 *** 0.0308 *** 0.0318 *** 0.0231 *** 0.0241 ***
0.0047 0.004759 0.004896 0.004307 0.004304
Issuance in euros -19.822 *** -25.550 *** -19.170 *** -19.344 *** -17.085 ***
4.5230 4.5511 4.5533 4.0554 4.6065
Firm Rating -10.091 *** -9.8168 *** -11.808 *** -12.138 *** -12.071 ***
2.0012 2.0025 1.9758 1.8250 1.8222
Bond Rating -28.950 *** -28.951 *** -27.571 *** -30.065 *** -29.999 ***
1.9447 1.9433 1.9240 1.7877 1.7866
Sovereign Rating -10.483 *** -10.805 *** -13.157 *** -12.587 ***
1.4751 1.5087 1.4847 1.5152
Consumer Goods -28.706 *** -30.682 *** -31.073 ***
6.1777 5.4298 5.4287
Utilities -14.141 ** -34.029 ** -33.436 **
5.9166 5.2449 5.2313
Industrials 16.379 *** 11.524 *** 11.204 ***
6.2794 5.5610 5.5732
Oil 39.124 *** 20.496 *** 22.113 ***
7.2483 6.5584 6.6079
Basic Materials -24.136 *** -29.359 *** -28.495 ***
6.5993 5.7904 5.7969
Telecommunication -25.826 *** -38.975 *** -38.289 ***
8.0008 6.9629 6.9960
Financial Crisis 140.83 ***
4.2065
Sovereign debt crisis 29.139 ***
3.0938
EA * Financial crisis 124.82 ***
6.9979
Non-EA * Financial crisis 145.11 ***
4.7097
EA * Debt crisis 36.242 ***
5.7970
Non-EA * Debt crisis 27.469 ***
3.3082
R-squared 0.481 0.485 0.498 0.606 0.607  
(1) Dependent variable: ASW spread; included observations: 5,427; White (1980) robust standard errors 
& covariances; symbols ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at 1%  5% and 10%, respectively. 
In order to take into account the possible non-linearities in the relationship between the 
premium on bond and the firm dimension highlighted in the previous section, we introduce    
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in the regression the variable size (expressed as total asset) both in levels and squared. The 
results  confirm  the  non-linearity  hypothesis  with  a  positive  coefficient  for  levels  and  a 
negative coefficient for squared values. However, it turns out that the beneficial effect of the 
size  (the  equivalent  of  the  too-big-to-fail  implicit  support  provided  by  governments  to 
systemic  banks)  kicks  in  only  at  a  very  large  dimension.  In  fact,  from  the  estimated 
coefficients, it can be computed that only firms with a total asset from around 400 billions of 
euro  enjoy  a  discount  on  the  ASW  spread  paid  at  launch.  As  far  as  other  firm-specific 
characteristics are concerned, the leverage and the firm rating have, as expected, a positive 
and a negative coefficient, respectively.  
The second column of Table 4 shows instead that the implicit guarantee provided by a 
sound  sovereign  has  a  beneficial  effect  on  the  ASW  spread  paid  by  firms.  In  fact,  the 
coefficient of the sovereign rating turns out to be negative and the coefficients of both bond 
rating and issuer rating do not change.
4 This effect is similar to that detected for the banking 
system (Grande et al. 2011; Lindh and Schich 2012, Cardillo and Zaghini 2012): a high 
sovereign rating reflects a positive market assessment of the soundness of public finances, 
which in turn means room of manoeuvre to intervene in the economy with expansionary 
measures when needed (via direct support to the economy as a whole or targeted industry 
interventions). In addition, rating agencies are attaching raising importance to the growth 
outlook of scrutinised economies, thus a high sovereign rating hint at a favourable economic 
framework for domestic firms’ activities. The estimated coefficient suggests that an increase 
                                                           
4  By  interacting  the  “Sovereign  Rating”  variable  with  two  time  dummies  (non-crisis  period  and  crisis 
period), it turns out that the negative coefficient is significantly higher in absolute terms during the phases of 
financial distress.    
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in the sovereign rating by one notch reduces the spread paid at launch by domestic firms by 
10 basis points.
 5 
When looking at the industry group we detect a precise pattern with firms belonging to 
consumer  goods,  utilities,  basic  materials  and  telecommunication  paying  a  statistically 
significant smaller premium on bond issuance, while those from industrials and oil paying a 
larger premium (Table 4, third column). 
In order to take into account the time dynamics of the ASW spread we introduce two 
time dummies in the regression. Focusing on the first wave of the financial crisis (2008 and 
2009), we estimate an increase of 141 bp in the premium paid by non-financial corporations 
in that period, while the second wave of the crisis – which from the second half of 2010 took 
the form of a sovereign debt crisis – brought about a relatively smaller increase of around 30 
bp in the ASW spread (fourth column). However, given that the two waves of the crisis were 
felt differently across geographic areas, we interact the time dummies with two sub-samples: 
euro-area firms and “UK plus US” (non-EA) firms. In fact, the last column of Table 4 shows 
that while the crisis which originated in the summer 2007 in the US subprime mortgage 
market hit US and UK firms in 2008 and 2009 in a more painful way than euro-area peers 
(145 bp and 125 bp, respectively), the opposite is true for the second wave of the financial 
turbulence, which hit primarily euro-area firms with an increase in the ASW spread paid at 
issuance of 36 bp versus 27 bp for non euro area firms.
6 
Given that the sovereign debt crisis was felt differently also within the euro area, we 
further investigate the issue by focusing on firms from the euro area only, which consists in 
                                                           
5 Cardillo and Zaghini (2012) estimate that the implicit guarantee provided by a triple-A sovereign may add 
up to a reduction of the premium of about 80 bp. Following their framework over the same time spam, we 
estimate that the reduction amounts to 21 bp for the non-financial corporations. 
6 Both differences are statistically significant according to the standard Wald test.    
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an initial set of 1,200 bonds issued by 300 non-financial corporations. The first column of 
Table 5 shows that the basic characteristics and even the magnitude of the coefficients are 
maintained also in the restricted euro-area sample, with the only exception of size: total asset 
in levels has the expected negative sign – even though the statistical significance is weaker – 
and non-linearities do not appear any more. At the same time, it is confirmed that a sound 
creditworthiness of the sovereign reduces the premium at launch (second column).  
Table 5: OLS regressions for the euro area
1 
L everage 0.5527 *** 0.4787 *** 0.4786 *** 0.4959 *** 0.4507 ***
0.1356 0.1334 0.1402 0.141 6 0.1402
T otal A sset -0.1246 * -0.1728 ** -0.0738 * -0.0320 -0.0783 *
0.0675 0.0554 0.0420 0.046 5 0.0448
D u ration 0.0073 *** 0.0074 *** 0.0064 *** 0.0063 *** 0.0073 ***
0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.001 3 0.0014
V olu m e 0.0562 *** 0.0508 *** 0.0494 *** 0.0531 *** 0.0374 ***
0.0089 0.0089 0.0086 0.008 9 0.0085
Issu an ce in  eu ros -26.800 *** -25.099 *** -15.906 ** -12.939 * -18.965 **
8.3594 8.1367 7.8036 7.810 2 7.7046
F irm  R atin g -22.668 *** -21.563 *** -18.478 *** -17.432 *** -16.715 **
6.0944 6.0616 6.1126 6.256 1 6.5566
B on d  R atin g -18.929 *** -18.067 *** -27.238 *** -27.932 *** -30.078 ***
6.0402 5.9990 6.3501 6.428 5 6.5850
S overeign  R atin g -11.872 *** -10.831 *** -11.941 *** -5.5021 **
1.4279 1.4765 2.101 9 2.8956
O il 84.011 *** 77.813 *** 92.200 ***
18.8065 18.922 9 1 5.0365
B asic M aterials 57.512 *** 56.629 *** 56.549 ***
18.9416 18.786 8 1 6.8399
C on su m er G & S -27.372 *** -29.751 *** -16.845 *
11.2387 11.259 0 9.1608
T & T -19.610 * -21.613 * -19.816 **
12.2547 12.277 3 9.7494
G erm an y -22.713 ***
8.571 1
Italy -40.301 **
18.063 8
S p ain -2.0770
19.686 4
P ortu gal 15.709
31.436 5
Irelan d -11.004
32.146 2
G E R *F in an cial C risis 72.959 ***
1 2.4322
IT A *F in an cial C risis 54.521 **
2 5.3089
S P A *F in an cial C risis 45.590 **
2 2.6261
P O R *F in an cial C risis 71.093 *
4 9.8823
IR E *F in an cial C risis 179.07 ***
1 3.3718
G E R *D eb t C risis -41.754 ***
1 0.3408
IT A *D eb t C risis 66.705 ***
2 5.5322
S P A *D eb t C risis 87.169 ***
2 5.9905
P O R *D eb t C risis 119.07 ***
3 9.9507
IR E *D eb t C risis 17.053
4 6.7349
R -sq u ared 0.471 0.497 0.532 0.538 0.563  
(1) Dependent variable: ASW spread; included observations: 1126; White (1980) robust standard errors 
& covariances; symbols ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at 1%  5% and 10%, respectively.    
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Finally,  when  looking  at  the  industry  breakdown,  we  have  that  firms  from 
Telecommunication & Technology and Consumer Goods & Services pay a smaller premium, 
whereas those from Oil and Basic material pay a higher ASW spread (third column).
7 
In order to control for cross-country differences within the euro area, we introduce a 
dummy variable for each country involved in the sovereign debt crisis and Germany (fourth 
column). The country coefficients shows that, ceteris paribus, German firms were able to get 
a  23  bp  smaller  premium  at  issuance.  Also  Italian  firms  had  a  discount  on  their  bond 
placement (40 bp), most likely due to the fact that only major Italian firms (ENEL, ENI and 
FIAT) tap regularly the bond market. At the same time, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant for Spain, Portugal and Ireland.  
When considering the crisis period specifically divided into the first and second wave 
of turmoil, we find that in the period  2008-2009 all firms in the sample, regardless of the 
nationality, faced an increase in the ASW spread paid when issuing medium- to long-term 
bonds, ranging from the 46 bp of Spanish firms to the 179 bp of Irish firms. The striking 
difference concerns the sovereign debt crisis period which involved mainly Southern Europe 
countries:  firms  headquartered  in  Italy,  Spain  and  Portugal  witnessed  an  increase  in  the 
premium paid of 67, 87 and 119 basis points, respectively. At the same time German firms 
where able to get a reduction in the ASW spread of 42 bp.  
The negative spillover from the sovereign debt market to the private sector, which 
characterised the issuance of bank bonds,
8 seems to have affected also non-financial firms 
                                                           
7 Firms operating in the basic materials industry pay an additional premium with respect to other firms in 
the euro area, while it is the contrary in the US. This might be due to: 1) the different overall specialization 
pattern in the two economies; 2) the fact that there are less raw materials in Europe than US. 
8 For a thorough analysis of the different channels through which sovereign risk affects bank funding 
conditions and viceversa see CGFS (2011) and  Gerlach et al. (2010). 
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adding a second channel of influence from the sovereign to the corporate sector. In fact, in 
addition to the fact that a poor sovereign creditworthiness increases the ASW spread paid by 
domestic firms with respect to non-financial corporations headquartered in sounder countries 
(the direct effect of the sovereign rating found over the whole sample), the sovereign debt 
crisis added a burden only on firms from the weakest states, widening the gap with firms 
from higher rated states. The case of German firms is striking: during the first wave of the 
financial crisis, when the sovereign debt market was not yet affected, they faced a significant 
increase in the premium paid at issuance – in line with firms from Italy, Spain and Portugal – 
however, when the market overhaul of the sovereign risk assessment took place, German 
firms were able to get a sizable reduction in the premium paid. 
3. Conclusion 
The  paper  provides  a  broad  overview  of  the  recent  trend  in  medium  to  long-term 
funding costs by non-financial firms in the US, the UK and the euro area. In particular, we 
study  the  dynamics  of  the  premium  paid  at  issuance  by  non-financial  corporations  and 
analyse the contribution of several factors to the cost incurred by firm when issuing bonds. 
We focus on the asset swap spread at issuance which is a measure of the actual cost faced by 
firms on each bond in addition to the risk-free component (which can not be diversified 
away). Indeed, the ASW spread reflects the market assessment of the firm riskiness at the 
moment of the bond placement and represents the idiosyncratic additional cost for the firm. 
In order to disentangle the factors affecting the cost at launch, we propose an empirical 
investigation based  on  around  5,500 bonds  issued between  January  2005  and  December 
2012. The time span allows us to analyse the two phases on the current crisis: the early 
financial crisis following the collapse of the subprime mortgage market and the demise of 
Lehman Brothers and the later euro-area sovereign debt crisis. As for the latter, starting from    
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mid 2010, concerns about the sustainability of public finances in several euro-area countries 
led  to  a  deterioration  of  the  perceived  sovereign  creditworthiness.  In  parallel  with  the 
worsening  of  funding  conditions  of  the  domestic  country  and  the  related  sovereign 
downgrades by the rating agencies, many non-financial corporations suffered the same fate 
with increasing CDS spreads and widespread downgrades by several notches. 
The  econometric  evidence  shows  that  the  soundness  of  public  finances  played  a 
substantial role in shaping the cost of bond issuance, in particular in the euro area. We find 
that the backing of a sound sovereign provides an important implicit support to the domestic 
private issuer, while weaker governments add a burden on the funding cost of domestic 
firms.  In  fact,  during  the  sovereign  debt  crisis  firms  headquartered  in  Italy,  Spain  and 
Portugal  paid  between  66  and  119  basis  points  of  extra  premium  due  to  the  negative 
spillover from the sovereign debt market turbulence. On the contrary, German firms faced a 
significant increase in the premium paid at issuance in the early phase of the financial crisis 
– in line with firms from Italy, Spain and Portugal – but during the sovereign debt crisis they 
were able to get a sizable reduction in the premium paid (42 basis points). Thus, our findings 
suggest that the vicious linkage between the sovereign and banking system acknowledged by 
the literature extends also to non-financial corporations. 
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